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WELLSAND v. VALPARAISO COMMUNITY SCHOOL
CORPORATION: EQUAL PROTECTION FOR THE
MARRIED FOOTBALL PLAYER
I do not think differences of treatment under law should be ap-
proved on classification because of differences unrelated to the
legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable
difference that can be pointed out between those bound and those
left free.'
Charles Wellsand, a student in Valparaiso, Indiana, was married
before his final year in high school. During the prior year he had dis-
tinguished himself on the football field, thereby developing the potential
for securing a full college athletic scholarship. However, an Indiana High
School Athletic Association (IHSAA) rule prohibiting married students
from participating in interscholastic sports was applied to Wellsand his
senior year.' Alleging that the rule drew an irrational distinction between
married and unmarried students, Wellsand petitioned a federal district
court to enjoin its enforcement.8
STATE ACTION' AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
The complaint in Wellsand alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970).' The court found that the making and enforcement of
the rule by the IHSAA constituted sufficient state action to satisfy the
requirements of that section. This finding of state action enabled the court
to assume jurisdiction despite the defendant's contention that there could
be no judicial review of rules promulgated by a voluntary organization.
1. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 115 (1949) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
2. Rule K, IHSAA 1970-1971 HANDBOOK 49:
Married students shall not be eligible for participation in inter-school athletic
competition. Students who have been divorced or whose marriages have been
annuled are bound by the above rule.
3. Wellsand v. Valparaiso Community Schools Corp., No. 71 H 122(2) (N.D.
Ind., Sept. 1, 1971).
4. The right to equal protection is included under the "rights, privileges or immuni-
ties" clause of § 1983: however, to come within the § 1983 requirement of "under color
of any statute, ordinance, or regulation . . . of any State" there must be state action.
Agencies and regulatory bodies of the states have fallen within this categorization.
Cf., Muhammad Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 316 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), where the court found that the boxing commission's denial of a license violated
equal protection. The commission was found to be part of a state agency, so that state
action was involved when it issued boxing licenses.
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An earlier Indiana case, State ex rel. IHSAA v. Lawrence Circuit
Court,5 had held that since interscholastic sports were not part of the
state's educational program the II-SAA was a voluntary association,"
and, therefore, its rules were not subject to judicial review. The case was
based upon prior state decisions7 which held voluntary associations free
to enforce their rules and regulations by any means they might deem
proper. Nevertheless, while admitting that the IIISAA was a voluntary
association, the Wellsand court found that this fact alone did not
preclude judicial review under § 1983 if the association's actions or rules
constitute state action. The court reasoned that public high schools cannot
violate the rights of students by "cloaking their activities within the
framework of a purported voluntary association" such as the IH.SAA.8
Furthermore, since the IHSAA was found to be dependent upon state-
financed facilities such as football bleachers and basketball gymnasiums,'
the state action requirement was held fulfilled.
The Wellsand finding of state action in a voluntary association
context was not without precedent. In Smith v. Young Men's Christian
Association" the local YMCA's racially discriminatory admissions
regulation was struck down under § 1983. The district court found that
through both tax exemptions and a co-operative use of city recreational
5. 240 Ind. 114, 162 N.E.2d 250 (1959), involved petition for a writ of prohibition
to prevent a suit concerning an IHSAA eligibility rule from coming to trial. The issue
of the court's jurisdiction to enjoin the IHSAA from carrying out its rules was resolved
in favor of the IHSAA. The court refused to interfere with the unofficial and non-
governmental capacities of the association.
6. However, the IHSAA's Handbook states the association's purpose as follows:
The proper administration of high school athletics is a prime concern of the
members of this organization. The basic purpose of inter-scholastic athletics
is to promote the goals of education through wholesome competition in sports.
The IHSAA was created to foster athletics as a positive influence in the educa-
tional experience of high school students. Much time and effort are spent by
educators throughout our state in order to accomplish this purpose.
IHSAA 1970-1971 HANDBoo 2-3. Any school certified by the State Department of Pub-
lic Instruction may join the IHSAA if it chooses and is willing to follow the rules of the
association. There are 438 members of the IHSAA, of which most are public schools
owned and operated by governmental subdivisions of the state. Art. 2 of the IHSAA
constitution states that all activities of the association "shall remain an integral factor in
the total secondary educational program." Also, the members of the governing body of
the IHSAA are school principals and athletic directors, most of whom are employees of
public schools. Thus, the voluntary nature of the organization diminishes when one
looks at the make-up and purposes of the association.
7. See North Dakota v. North Cent. Ass'n, 23 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Ill. 1938) ; State
ex rel. Givens v. Marion Super. Ct., 233 Ind. 235, 117 N.E.2d 553 (1954).
8. Slipsheet at 5.
9. Id. at 6.
10. 316 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. Ala 1970). The association was tax-exempt and had
entered into an agreement with the city to co-ordinate recreational facilities and programs.
379
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facilities, the organization had become so entwined with governmental
policies and so impregnated with governmental character as to be subject
to constitutional limitations grounded upon state action. Similarly, in
Louisiana High School Athletic Association v. St. Augustine High
School,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the regula-
tions of the state athletic association satisfied the state action requirement
because 85 per cent of the association's members were state-supported
schools. The finding of state action in St. Augustine was further support-
ed since high school principals were association officers, since funds from
games played on state-owned facilities financed the organization and
since the school's work and association's functions were highly inter-
related.
In effect the Wellsand and St. Augustine courts relied upon the
"public function" concept utilized by Mr. Justice Black in Marsh v.
Alabama.2 In finding the actions of a company town's management to
be state action, Justice Black stated:
Since these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit
the public and since their operation is essentially a public
function, it is subject to state regulation. 8
Therefore, the rules or actions of any group constitute state action if
their implementation might affect the use of facilities built and operated
primarily to benefit the public. While recognizing that state educational
programs only provide for physical education classes and leave inter-
scholastic sporting events to voluntary associations, both Wellsand and
St. Augustine extended the "public function" rationale to such associa-
tions. Interscholastic athletics perform a public function since public
facilities are used and public schools are association members. Therefore,
efforts to control high school athletics constitute state action.
By broadening the public function concept to include associations
operating on the periphery of state school systems, Wellsand narrows
11. 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968). Negro students sought to enjoin the association
from enforcing a racially segregated system of high school athletics in the state. The
association's plea of no state action was dismissed. See Comment, Current Developments
in State Action and Equal Protection of the Law, 4 GONZAGA L. REV. 233, 251 (1969).
12. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). This "public function" rationale was later used in Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). By so ruling, Burton went
further than Marsh had gone in extending state action because it held that if any sub-
stantial connection existed between the association and a public agency, state action
existed. Burton also held that blacks could not be denied entrance to a restaurant lo-
cated in a publicly owned parking garage leased from the parking authority. State action
existed because the "restaurant was an integral part of a public building." Id. at 723.
13. 326 U.S. at 506.
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the state action limitation upon federal intrusion into the private sector.
Therefore, the application of the equal protection clause to other voluntary
associations should be facilitated. Rules and actions of organizations
such as the Jaycees, Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Chamber of
Commerce could arguably be sufficiently "entwined" with city or state
governments to constitute state action. Therefore, the impact of Wellsand
may extend beyond the IESAA and married football players.
MARRIED STUDENTS' RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
AND THE "RATIONAL BASIS" TEST
Finding the "marriage rule" to be prima facie invalid because of
its discrimination between married and unmarried students, Judge Esch-
bach placed upon the IHSAA the burden of proving that married student
participation in interscholastic athletics should be prohibited." The as-
sociation put forward six reasons to justify its rule.
Initially, the IHSAA alleged that the rule would have "minimal
impact" because few students would be affected. The court found this
justification unpersuasive since "[e] qual protection of the law is design-
ed to protect all persons, not just the majority."' 5 As a second argument,
the IHSAA contended that the rule created more tearr positions for
unmarried students. Though recognizing the factual basis of this argu-
ment, the court found that it provided no rational basis for such a classi-
fication. The court did not further discuss these two arguments, apparent-
ly recognizing that they were statements that the distinction existed rather
than reasons for its existence.
The II{SAA's third argument was that the rule would reduce the
divorce rate. Judge Eschbach likewise found this position untenable,
stating that the valid functions of the Association did not include attempt-
14. Although Wellsand does not state directly that the burden rested on the IHSAA,
the fact that it was necessary for the IHSAA to show rational justification meant that
the usual presumption of validity attached by courts to such rules was overridden by the
prima facie arbitrariness of the rule. This same result was reached in Alexander v.
Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970). The court stated:
The burden of prosecuting in the state courts their alleged authority to deprive
a California high school student of his right to a public education merely be-
cause of the length of his sideburns must fall on the defendants. The plaintiff
has demonstrated in this court such a degree of arbitrary conduct on the part of
the defendants that justice required that the burden of expelling him must rest
with the defendants.
Id. at 1399. See also, Fujii v. State, 38 Cal2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). In a case in-
volving a suspect category, the ordinary presumption of validity is reversed, and the
state has the burden rather than the challenging party. Developments in the Law: Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1101 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection].
15. Slipsheet at 7.
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ing to affect the divorce rate in such an "untested manner."" A similar
analysis was used to dismiss the Association's contention that the drop-
out rate would increase if married students were allowed to participate in
interscholastic athletics.'7 In dismissing these contentions, the WVellsand
court relied upon the "rational basis" test since nonfundamental rights
and nonsuspect classifications were involved."8 This test, as delineated
in McGowan v. Maryland,"9 allows state governmental organs wide
discretion in enacting laws and regulations which affect groups of citizens
differently. The McGowan court stated:
Neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clause
demands logical tidiness. . . No finicky or exact conformity
to abstract correlation is required of legislation. The Constitu-
tion is satisfied if a legislature responds to the practical living
facts with which it deals. Through what precise points in a
field of many competing pressures a legislature might most
suitably have drawn its lines is not a question for judicial re-
examination. It is enough to satisfy the Constitution that in
drawing them the principle of reason has not been disregarded.
And what degree of uniformity reason demands of a statute is,
of course, a function of the complexity of the needs which the
statute seeks to accommodate.2"
Under the McGowan formula, only classifications resting upon grounds
wholly irrational, unreasonable or irrelevant to the achievement of the
state's objective are violative of the fourteenth amendment." In apply-
ing McGowan, therefore, courts have not found it necessary that every
16. Slipsheet at 11. The court refused to allow this justification because no statis-
tical evidence was offered and no "tests" were offered in evidence to show that the
"marriage rule" actually reduced divorce.
17. Slipsheet at 10.
18. A right is non-fundamental when it is not sufficiently important for courts to
scrutinize with utmost care in order to determine if deprivations have occurred. A clas-
sfication is non-suspect when the means used to classify are not as invidious as sex or
race. See note 34 infra and text accompanying.
19. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also Southway Discount Center, Inc. v. Moore, 315
F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ala. 1970), where the court applied the McGowan rule to uphold a
"Sunday closing" law that classified commercial establishments by the number of em-
ployees per firm.
20. 366 U.S. at 424.
21. 366 U.S. at 424-25. The Court stated that the constitutional principle is of.
fended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of the
state's objective. Statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts can
be conceived to iustify it reasonably.
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policy decision made by school boards be supported by statistical informa-
tion to substantiate the rational basis.2
Since no statistical evidence' was presented in Wellsand, it was not
clear that there was any correlation between the divorce or drop-out
rates and the participation of married students in interscholastic athletics.
Therefore, the Association's classification was deemed "irrational" and
violative of the McGowan test. The court's reasoning seems to require
that such classifications be based upon school authorities' observations
of the actual effect of married student athletic participation upon divorce
or drop-out rates.
Judge Eschbach's reasoning indicates that he was following
McGowan. The judge stated:
In the case at bar, it is unnecessary to decide which test should
be applied because . . . the reasons to justify the rule fail to
satisfy the more lenient "rational basis" test.24
Nevertheless, it is possible that his opinion goes beyond that theory by
requiring statistical proof to be presented in addition to other evidence
presented by the IHSAA. In refusing to give credence to the defendant's
drop-out argument, Judge Eschbach appears to be approximating the
"balancing of interests" approach used in substantive due process. In
fact the court may have decided that marriage outweighs any interest
which the IHSAA may have in maintaining the "marriage rule."20
22. See Estay v. La Fourche Parish School Bd., 230 So. 2d 443 (La. 1969), where
the court upheld a similar marriage rule and required no statistical proof to reinforce
the policy decision of the school board forbidding married students' participation in
extracurricular activities.
23. In Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 1269, 147 N.W.2d 854, 859
(1967), statistics were presented to and accepted by the court to justify barring a mar-
ried student from playing basketball. The survey showed that for the years 1960-1965,
97 out of 139 married students were dropouts. Also, in Kissick v. Garland Indep. School
Dist. 330 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), the court recognized that 24 out of
62 married students in the district dropped out of school. The court then recognized
this as a factor justifying a marriage rule.
24. Slipsheet at 6.
25. See Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 1131; Karst, Inzidious Discrimnationr:
Justice Douglas ad the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.
L.A. L. Rv. 716 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Karst].
See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), where the Supreme Court held
that neither deterring indigents from migrating to the state nor limiting welfare benefits
to those contributing to the state is a constitutionally permissible state objective for sup-
porting a one-year welfare waiting period; Pease v. Hansen, 40 U.S.L.W. 3238 (Nov. 16,
1971), where the Court, in a per curiam opinion, held:
Whether a welfare program is or is not federally funded is irrelevant to the
constitutional principles enunciated in Shapiro. ...
26. For a recent use of a similar due process argnment see Mr. Justice Harlan's
majority opinion in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), upholding an indigent's
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The court noted that an Indiana statute' allows men over eighteen
years of age to enter into marriage freely. The Association's "marriage
rule" undernines the policy of this statute by attaching a punitive sanc-
tion to certain marriages. Judge Eschbach reasoned that rather than
eliminating the whole class of married students from interscholastic sports
and, thereby, discouraging the institution of marriage, attempts to control
the drop-out problem should focus on specific solutions to the high
attrition rate." As to the divorce rate argument, the court seems to be
sayihg that school boards and associations may not determine and enforce
societal values.29 In dicta the opinion indicated that the divorce rate
contention, even if supported by statistical evidence, would be an insuf-
ficient justification for such a classification. The court stated:
If the schools are to have a part in decreasing the divorce rate,
such part must be in educating and preparing students for
entering the marital relationship."0
This approach would limit the historic power of school boards and
associations to affect student behavior through rules and regulations and,
right to obtain a divorce without paying court fees and costs for service of process as a
condition precedent to access to the courts.
27. IND. CODE § 31-1-1-1 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-101 (1965).
28. Contra, Estay v. La Fourche Parish School Bd., 230 So.2d 443 (La. 1969).
This case accepted the drop-out rationale as a reasonable justification and added that a
student had no right to compel a board of education to exercise discretion to his personal
advantage. Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963), held that
the rule against participation by married students in extracurricular activities bore a
reasonable relation to the problem of "dropouts" and did not constitute abuse of discre-
tion.
29. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate
Student Conduct md Status: A Non Constitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 373,
387-422 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein). Goldstein divides the function of con-
trol over education into two categories: (1) education per se and (2) serving as a host
to the pupils. The divorce justification falls into neither category because it puts the
school board into the position of determining and enforcing societal values. Even con-
ceding that divorce rates actually rose, the value judgment made by the board in Wellsand
forced students to conform to a value system imposed by the officers of a voluntary
athletic association which does not have the governmental functions of the legislature.
See also Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970), where the
court in the context of a regulation on hair stated:
Basic to our societal and governmental structures is the assumption that certain
areas of conduct, if subject to any governmental regulation at all, should be
regulated by the Legislature. The presumptions of our system of government
also require that such regulations be as explicit as possible where delegation to
an administrative agency is involved. Hence, a general grant of power to a
local school board should not be construed to enable it to make decisions of the
type that are generally and more appropriately reserved for the legislature.
Id. at 1395.
30. Slipsheet at 11-12.
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thereby, linit their power of discretion.
A fifth justification advanced by the IHSA-A was that the "marriage
rule" prevented "undesirable interrelations between married and un-
married students."'" The sixth contention argued that the "marriage
rule" forced the married student to discontinue athletics and fulfill his
economic and family responsibilities. 2 To answer these two contentions
the Wellsand court could have used any one of several theories.
Initially, the court could have utilized a "compelling state
interest""3 theory of equal protection. Under such an approach only a
"compelling state interest" can justify the denial of equal protection based
on a "suspect classification" or the abridgment of a "fundamental right.""4
The showing of a "suspect classification" may be difficult since govern-
ments often classify persons for income tax purposes according to their
marital status.33 However, it would be possible to categorize the right to
marry as "fundamental." In Loving v. Virginia 6 the Supreme Court
stated:
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id. at 7.
33. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), where the Court found Okla-
homa's "habitual criminal" sterilization act violative of equal protection:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights
of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far
reaching and devastating effects. . . . He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.
We mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the
States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of
the classification which a state inakes in. a sterilization law is essential, less un-
wittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against groups or
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal
laws.
Id. at 541 (emphasis added). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), where
the Court holds that any classification that serves to penalize the exercise of a constitu-
tional right, unless shown to be necessary to support a compelling governmental interest,
is void.
34. Cases using the "fundamental right" theory include: Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See Karst, supra note 25,
at 744.
Cases terming classifications suspect and open to strict scrutiny by the judiciary in-
clude: Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
35. Married persons have the advantage of filing a joint return and, thus, take ad-
vantage of lower tax rates. INT. Rxv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 1(a), 6013.
36. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental
to our very existence and survival. . . . To deny this funda-
mental freedom on so unsupportable a basis . . . is surely to
deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of
law.
3 7
Furthermore, the situation in Wellsand can be analogized to that in
Breen v. Kahl"5 in which the court found the plaintiff's desire to wear
long hair a "fundamental right," the regulation of which could be justified
only by the showing of a "compelling state interest." An analogy can be
drawn between the right to wear long hair and the right to participate in
interscholastic sports while married. Both involve choices within the
scope of private decision making. Regulation of neither may be justified
as preventing disruption of the educational process. No violence or dis-
ruption has resulted from married student participation in interscholstic
sports, and there is no reason to believe that such disruption will occur
in the future.
As a second alternative, the Wellsand court could have utilized the
"forced choice" theory found in Shapiro v. Thompson"9 to enjoin enforce-
ment of the "marriage rule." In Shapiro the Supreme Court held that
indigents have a fundamental right to interstate travel. A one-year
residency requirement for receipt of welfare payments was found to
necessitate a choice between receipt of those benefits and the exercise of
that right.4" Such a forced choice was found effectively to abridge an
indigent's right to travel interstate. The same rationale could have been
used in Wellsand by holding that the right to marry was burdened by a
forced choice between marriage and interscholastic athletic participation.
While this argument is implicit in the court's dicta,41 Judge Eschbach
avoided reliance upon the theory, possibly because he did not consider
37. Id. at 12.
38. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969). The court stated in regard to a student's free-
dom to choose the length of his hair:
To limit or curtail this or any other fundamental right, the state has a "sub-
stantial burden of justification."
Id. at 1036.
39. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
40. The Court found that the effect of the waiting-period requirement was to create
two classes of needy families. One was composed of indigents who had resided a year or
more in the jurisdiction, the second consisted of those who had resided in the state for
less than a year. The denial of welfare to the second group in effect forced them to
forego traveling into the jurisdiction because this would cause them to lose their welfare
payments.
41. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
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the loss of athletic eligibility to be as important as the loss of economic
benefits.
The third approach, and the one which the court adopted, was the
"rational basis" test." While recognizing that both the avoidance of
"undesirable interrelations" and the fostering of "economic and family
responsibility" were valid functions of the IHSAA, the court rejected the
classifications implementing these purposes as being either over- or under-
inclusive. In analyzing the "undesirable interrelations" justification, the
court found that such interrelation could take place absent any participa-
tion in interscholastic athletics.4" The classification, therefore, was under-
inclusive.4  Similarly, Judge Eschbach's analysis of the proposed
"economic and family responsibility" justification led him to conclude
that it was overinclusive because not all married students have to devote
time to employment in order to fulfill their economic obligations. This
same justification was also found to be underinclusive since many un-
married students must assume economic responsibilities.
By seemingly requiring the "marriage rule" to remedy all problems
of "undesirable interrelations" and "economic and family responsibilities,"
a strict correlation requirement appears to emerge.4" This requirement
42. This test is discussed in Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 1077. For examples
of the application of this test, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ; South-
way Discount Center, Inc. v. Moore, 315 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
43. The IHSAA argued that married students would "infest" the minds of other
players while in the locker room with stories relating to the married students' sexual ex-
periences. Slipsheet at 9. In Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d
854 (1967), the Iowa Supreme Court recognized that the personal relationships of mar-
ried students are different from those of non-married students and that non-married stu-
dents can be unduly influenced as a result of relationships with married students. The
court decided that the rule barring married students from participating in extracurricular
activities was neither "arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational, unauthorized, nor unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 1271, 147 N.W.2d at 860.
44. Given that married students cause certain mischief in the athletic locker rooms,
the classification would be underinclusive in that no regulations were in effect that pro-
hibited similar mischief in the cafeteria, physcal education classes and after school hours.
If the defining trait is the possibility of undesirable interrelations, the classification is
prima facie in violation of equal protection because it does not include other "interaction
points." This traditional limited judicial scrutiny approach is discussed in Tussman &
ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF. L. Rxv. 341 (1949).
45. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), a case involving the rights of bas-
tards under Louisiana's wrongful death statute, Mr. Justice Douglas stated the equal
protection test in terms of the rationality of the line drawn. However, Justices Black,
Harlan and Stewart, in dissent, contended that no exactness was required between the
classifications and what the Court felt was a proper purpose. The Court should not have
stricken the statute, according to the dissenters, because better lines might have been
drawn, especially where the rights involved were non-fundamental and the classifications
non-suspect. However, Wellsand seems to require an exactness between the classifica-
tion and the purpose. This strict correlation goes beyond the "rationality of the line
drawn" and seems to require a stricter test of equal protection.
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differs from the traditional view that underinclusion, when administra-
tively necessary or experimentally desired, does not deny equal protection
under the "rational basis" test.4" Judge Eschbach, therefore, appears to
have based his conclusion on either or both of two possibilities: (1) the
underinclusion was administratively unnecessary and not stifling of
experimentation;47 (2) the strict correlation required was more akin to
the "compelling state interest" test utilized in Shapiro than to the
"rational basis" test."8
A parallel can be drawn between Wellsand and Levy v. Louisiana.9
The Court in Levy found the state's classification of children into
"legitimate" and "illegitimate" for the purpose of determining eligibility
to bring an action for the wrongful death of the children's mother was
an invidious discrimination when no action, conduct or demeanor of the
children was possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother.
In both Wellsand and Levy "non-fundamental" rights were involved.
Justice Douglas in Levy states that the classification must have relation
to the wrong allegedly prevented by the rule:
Though the test has been variously stated, the end result is
whether the line drawn is a rational one.
46. Equal Protection, upra note 14, at 1084.
47. The marriage rule was not administratively necessary because married students,
in playing sports, caused no problems that were not also present when the students ate
in the school cafeteria or went to physical education classes together. That there was
no stifling of experimentation to justify tmderinclusion was evidenced by the long dura-
tion of the rule. If the school wished to experiment, it should do so in the opposite
direction-allowing married students to participate in order to see if any new problems
arose.
48. The difference between this "strict correlation" test (which closely approxi-
mates a "compelling interest" standard) and the "rational basis" test can best be demon-
strated by using an example. Hypothesize two students, A and B, whose families are
experiencing economic problems. A is married, and his economic responsibility is to-
ward his wife (and children, perhaps). B is unmarried, but he is the oldest of ten chil-
dren, and his father is crippled and unemployed. The sole purpose of the "marriage
rule" is to make it more likely that students like A will devote their spare time to ful-
filling their economic obligations by compelling them not to spend that time playing
interscholastic sports. Under the "rational basis" rule, this classification is permissible
becaue it fulfills the purpose of the law-making body. Under the Wellsanzd reasoning,
however, the "marriage rule" would fall because it does not similarly coerce the group
of students represented by B, who are just as much in "need" of the rule's compulsion.
Wellsand forbade the IHSAA and the school corporation to attempt partial solutions by
requiring that they choose between no rule and one reasonably designed to remedy all
problems that correlate with the mischief they seek to overcome. In doing so, the court
applied a "strict correlation."
49. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See note 45 supra.
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Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature
of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother.... "
Similarly2 Judge Eschbach placed emphasis both on the fact that the
"marriage rule" had little direct relation to its alleged purposes and that
a higher standard of "rationality"' is required for validating such a rule.
The type of analysis used in these cases, however, is open to the criticism
that the courts are engaging in exercises of a legislative character. 1
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES FOR EQUAL PROTECTION
Regulations promulgated by athletic associations and school boards
are ripe for attack under the Wellsand reasoning.52 One such vulnerable
regulation is an eligibility rule of the IHSAA which requires high school
students who have transferred schools without an accompanying move by
their parents to wait one year before becoming eligible to participate in
interscholastic sports.5" The curtailment of high school athletic recruit-
ment is apparently the purpose behind this rule. Under the traditional
"rational basis" analysis any court would most likely find that the classi-
fication implemented a valid purpose and violated no constitutional
rights. Therefore, the discretion of the principal in enforcing the rule
and that of the IHSAA in drafting it would not be disturbed. Under
Wellsand, however, such a rule may now violate the mandate of equal
protection.
Initially, the transfer student rule is both under- and overinclusive.
50. 391 U.S. at 71-72.
51. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
52. For a case in which the plaintiff attempted to use a similar equal protection
rationale but failed, see Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., No. 32028
(Marshall [Ind.] Cir. Ct., Apr. 29, 1971). The case involved IHSAA Rule 9, § 7,
which states:
Boys and girls shall not be permitted to participate in inter-school athletic
games as mixed teams, nor shall boys' teams and girls' teams participate against
each other in inter-school athletic contests.
The IHSAA constitution, art. 3, provides that if any member is unable to comply with
an association rule the school is automatically suspended from the association unless
there has been a court hearing.
The court upheld the IHSAA rule prohibiting "mixed teams" as justified by dif-
ferences in athletic abilities between the sexes. Prohibition of female participation in
sports such as tennis, golf and track is more difficult to justify than in others because
such sports lack the physical contact that has been cited to justify sexual classification
in sports like basketball and football. Haas may be a stronger equal protection case than
Wellsand since classifications based on sex may more easily fall under the stricter test
applied to "suspect" classifications. This case is being appealed to the Indiana Supreme
Court. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 40 U.S.L.W.
4013 (Nov. 22, 1971), would almost seem to compel reversal in Haas.
53. IHSAA 1970-1971 HANDBOOK, rule 22.
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If prevention of recruiting is its purpose, the rule is underinclusive since
coaches and principals may avoid it by convincing parents to move into a
certain school district in order to make their son eligible to compete.
i-However, the real evil in such a rule is its overinclusive effect. Students
who have not been recruited are still required to wait a full year before
beconfing eligible. In Sturrup v. Mahan5" a student transferred from a
Florida to an Indiana high school, moving in with his brother who had
been declared his legal guardian. The IHSAA declared the athlete ineligi-
ble because the rule required either an accompanying parental move or a
showing of extreme hardship, and compliance with neither requirement
could be demonstrated. No evidence was ever presented that the student
had been recruited. Under the reasoning in Wellsand, it would seem that
the IHSAA's classification bears no "strict correlation" to the purpose of
the ruleY Furthermore, at least as to out-of-state students, the rule seems
to impede interstate travel in the same way as the Connecticut residency
statute was held to do in Shapiro.
Another educationally related application of Wellsand could be to
school board rules requiring students to leave school imnfediately upon
discovery of pregnancy.56 While such rules have been upheld as being in
the interest of the student, many cases exist in which the young woman's
safety could not have been impaired by attending classes during the early
stages of her pregnancy. Such a classification may be attacked as an
attempt by school officials to force their own standards of morality upon
students.5" Any health dangers which may be present in a classroom are
54. No. S 71 C779 (Monroe [Ind.] Super. Ct., Oct. 8, 1971) (temporary restrain-
ing order granted) and No. 71 C160 (Owen (Ind.] Cir. Ct., Oct. 15, 1971) (after
change of venue, preliminary injunction denied).
55. The purpose of the rule is obviously to prevent high schools from recruiting
athletes from outside the school district. It is overinclusive because it subjects to its
strictures both recruited athletes and students who have moved for legitimate reasons.
Another purpose may be to keep star athletes from moving into the school district
with the sole intent to create a state championship team. But again the purpose is im-
plemented by a classification (parents move/parents do not move with student) that is
overinclusive in that it includes students who fit the classification, but who had no
intent of forming championship teams. Thus, there is no "strict correlation" between
the rule's purpose and its effect. See note 48 supra.
56. A school board rule forcing pregnant students, whether married or unmarried,
to quit school immediately upon discovering their pregnancy and giving school officials
the power to demand a doctor's examination in questionable cases was upheld in State ex
rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 262, 175 N.E.2d 539 (Butler County C.P. 1961).
The Attorney General of Ohio rendered an opinion that such a rule was contrary to
the policy of Ohio, but the court dismissed his opinion and stated that the board was
acting in the interest of the girl's safety.
57. Goldstein, supra note 29, at 426, concludes that the statutory grant of power to
school boards never contained the power to regulate all matters concerning education,
much less matters concerned with other social interests. The Wellsand court answers
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also present when the student walks to the corner grocery. Such a
classification denies her an opportunity to finish her education at a time
when doing so may be of the greatest importance. Bearing children is a
private matter. Therefore, the realm of private choice is extremely
limited when such decisions are influenced by a school board rule which
forces a young student to choose between bearing a child and finishing
her formal education. The school board may try to justify such a rule as a
means of discouraging premarital sex. Nevertheless, such a rule is over-
inclusive since it includes married students. The Wellsand court's dicta
indicates that while such a purpose may be valid, sexual education classes
rather than an overinclusive classification is the proper n eans of achiev-
ing it. At least Wellsand seems to indicate that school officials may have
to demonstrate by statistical proof that their rule will have the intended
effect.
School boards and school-related voluntary associations will pro-
bably not remain passive while courts strike down their rules." A method
available for preventing judicial intrusions is to abandon broad classifica-
tion schemes like male/female, married/unmarried, pregnant/non-
pregnant and to adopt regulations based on categories characterized by a
greater correspondence between the mischief to be controlled and the
classification used. In this manner the school-related voluntary organiza-
tion could maintain some control over the mischief yet avoid any equal
protection attack. 9 For example, if the IHSAA recognized an acute
problem of married athletes dropping out of a particular school, it could,
in conjunction with the local school board, promulgate a local rule giving
discretion to the principal or the coach to decide whether certain married
individuals could participate in interscholastic sports. Thus, policies un-
his question as to who will determine the existence or nonexistence of harm and, thus,
opens the way for future court evaluation of school policies in the areas of personal
freedom and personal decision making.
58. The IHSAA is appealing the Wellsand decision, but it avoided possible con-
flict with the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Eschbach by amending its constitu-
tion eight days after the injunction took effect. The original constitution would have
forced dismissal of the Valparaiso school from the IHSAA (See note 52 supra). How-
ever, the injunction expressly forbade the IHSAA to "impos[e] any sanctions or pro-
hibitions against the defendant Valparaiso Community Schools Corporation." Slipsheet
at 13. The IHSAA amended art. 3 of its constitution to comply with the preliminary
injunction by allowing member schools to obey any court order issued after a hearing.
59. In Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970), school officials admitted
that the health and safety objectives allegedly threatened by a student's long hair could
be attained through narrower rules directed specifically at problems created by long
hair. Thus, the officials failed to sustain the substantial burden of justifying the ex-
clusion of a long-haired student from class, and their action denied equal protection to
male students.
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enforceable through broad, irrational categories like sex or marriage
could be implemented by the particularized and highly rational decisions
of the local school board. If the equal protection objections voiced by the
Wellsand court are solved by making such nondiscriminatory classifica-
tions, the courts might once again defer to the associations. However, if
the courts were still dissatisfied with the actions of the associations, they
might be prompted to abandon the equal protection clause as a method of
evaluating the arbitrariness of the classification. The courts may then
directly examine the function and scope of such voluntary associations in
promulgating rules affecting the rights of high school students."0 What-
ever the means ultimately adopted, the Wellsand decision renders it likely
that school boards and other voluntary organizations will no longer be
able to rely upon judicial support for broad discretionary classifications.
RANDOLPH L. SEGER
60. It has been suggested that equal protection has taken over where substantive
due process left off. Equal Protection, szrpra note 14, at 1131-32. This development of
equal protection as a ratio decidendi for due process may stop when classifications are in
tune with the mischief sought to be remedied. The courts may then be compelled to re-
vert back to using substantive due process.
